Last week, Mike Rothman (here http://securityincite.com/TDI-2008-06-05#TBP1)
was commenting on Stuart Kings's blog claims (see http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/05/david-lacey-makes-the-importan.html):
Systems are simply too
complicated with too many lines of code for anyone to expect that they can be
released without containing bugs and security holes. That doesn't mean that we
shouldn't try, it just means that we should take a different approach. That
approach, in my opinion, is to take a leaf out of the new edition of the PCI standards and stick a
ruddy great application firewall in front of everything. That doesn't make the
code secure, it's a sticking plaster over a wound. But - to continue the analogy
- a plaster stops the bleeding, prevents germs getting in, and while it's not a
cure, it's good enough.
First, I'd like to make it clear that in my opinion, WAF is
the right first line of defense. In some cases, it will serve as the only line
of defense. The questions should not be whether secure code is possible or when
to fix versus using WAF. The question is how to provide continuous security
while application problems are being fixed. There's always one more bug and the
WAF will be there for you. Rain or shine it's there for you. And now comes the
"but"...We should strive to write secure code and we need to fix the problems
we had discovered and then fix the problems that the previous fixes created.









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