Sharon Besser: May 2008 Archives

I am a big fan of conspiracy theories and the business of being paranoid. This must be the reason that I'm in the proactive security business for more than a decade now. I truly believe in Andrew Grove's Only the Paranoid Survive. So with great joy I read this month's IEEE Spectrums' article about the US department of Defense Cyber Trust's Trust in Integrated Circuits Program.

The DoD would like to ensure that commercial, off-the-shelf chips and other 21st century building blocks used for military purposes do not carry malicious components or code that can be used as a backdoor. A kill switch or backdoor built into an encryption chip could be compromised or programmed remotely to be turned off. Other chips might be instructed to change mission route, etc. In short, the DARPA program is about finding a way to vet chips, and determine which ones can be trusted.

The DoD had selected 3 companies (Raytheon, Luna Innovations, and Xradia ) to provide a solution. Each provided a different alternative. Here is the short version from the article:

  • Xradia, in Concord, Calif., builds nondestructive X-ray microscopes used widely in the semiconductor industry, so it may be looking at a new method of inspecting chips based on soft X-ray tomography. Soft X-rays are powerful enough to penetrate the chip but not strong enough to do irreversible damage.
  • Luna Innovations, in Roanoke, Va., specializes in creating anti-tamper features for FPGAs.  Their approach may involve narrowing down the number of possible unspecified functions. Chip security [is compared to] to a barricaded home. The front door and windows might offer vault-like protection, but there might be an unknown window in the basement. The Luna researchers are looking for the on-chip equivalent of the basement window.
  • Raytheon, of Waltham, Mass., has expertise in hardware and logic testing. The company would use Boolean equivalence checking to analyze what types of inputs will generate certain outputs.

As I read about, it hit me that the 3 companies are implementing SecureSphere-like technologies for chips!

Narrowing down the number of possible unspecified functions: that's exactly what dynamic profiling enforcement provides! It checks for allowed operations only and prevent all other unknown and unauthorized operations.

Soft X-rays inspection that are powerful enough to penetrate but not strong enough to do damage using the same concept of transparent inspection.  Imperva's Transparent Inspection technology delivers multi-gigabit performance, sub-millisecond latency, and options for high availability that meet the requirements of even the most demanding application and database environments.

Boolean equivalence checking is similar to Correlated Attack Validation. Distinguishing between attacks and valid user traffic. By basing decisions on multiple observations rather than a single event, CAV delivers a highly accurate and completely automated defense system--achieving overall accuracy that cannot be matched by several standalone data security products, not to mention that SecureSphere examines and can match requests and responses.

 Yea, Only the Paranoid Survive.


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May 5, 2008

WAF. Defined.

One of the outcomes of the PCI Security Standards Council information supplement for PCI DSS requirement 6.6 that I blogged about last week,  is providing a definition of Web Application Firewalls. The definition was made by creating 3 different set of required capabilities:

  1. List of recommended capabilities. Tasks "that a WAF should be able to do"
  2. More advanced capabilities listed as "additional recommended capabilities for certain environments".
  3. Even more advanced capabilities listed as "additional considerations"

It is a bold attempt to create a product definition for the market by listing different requirements. Thus far, the industry is based on the Web Application Security Consortium (WAFEC) , that develops the industry standard testing criteria for evaluating the quality of web application firewall solutions.

I was very excited when I examined the list, as a close review of all the requirements reveals that the folks at the PCI Security Standards Council added some very advanced capabilities. Without arguing whether scanners are capable identify the issues that WAF are now required to address. In my opinion, out of the list of 10 recommended capabilities, two capabilities stand out:

  1. Prevent data leakage--meaning have the ability to inspect web application output and respond (allow, block, mask and/or alert) based on the active policy or rules, and log actions taken.
  2. Inspect any protocol (proprietary or standardized) or data construct (proprietary or standardized) that is used to transmit data to or from a web application, when such protocols or data is not otherwise inspected at another point in the message flow.
The first requirement, data leakage prevention is clear and understood in light of the overwhelming number of organizations that had suffered from information breaches (this topic alone can fill up this blog...)

But the second requirement is more interesting. It clearly links between application that provide data and web applications. It requires to inspect (and protect) any protocol that is used to deliver data to web applications. In other words, inspecting SQL is now a recommended requirement for Web Application Firewalls!

When you look at the picture below, you can see that this is exactly what we've been talking about in the past 5 years or so. In our very first product announcement in October 2002,  Shlomo Kramer stated : "Our vision is simple: Secure the Enterprise Application Sphere... ... from web servers to application servers and databases"

What is  Entailed_3.png

SANS endorsed this approach when they published the SANS top 20 Internet Security Risks of 2007 by stating the same: "It is not sufficient to protect the database alone...all the associated applications need to be secured".
Rich Mogull was talking about it when he wrote about protection of content (SB: data) in business applications "....from your web application stack to internal applications and databases." 

And now the PCI Data Security Standards....
It is very rewarding to see how the industry is accepting our very original vision now.

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